In argument about moral problems, relativism is the first refuge of the scoundrel.

Roger Scruton, Modern Philosophy

The presence of those seeking the truth is infinitely preferred to the presence of those who think they've found it.

Terry Prachett, Monstrous Regiment

Let's just work on your last two sentences for a moment. It's common to talk about a "higher standard of morality," but since morality is not the sort of thing to which elevation applies, 'higher' must be metaphorical. Let's try to be literal, just for clarity's sake. Words such as 'superior' or 'greater' won't do--they really just mean higher and bigger. It seems we must be talking about a better morality. So relativism lets us hold ourselves to a better morality.

But there's a problem. 'Better' is only the comparative form of Good, and according to relativism it is we as a society who define what is good. How will we decide? We can't choose the better version of good--that's nonsense. It seems society will be holding itself to the morality that it prefers. Though, of course, society will not be unanimous. At best, relativism teaches us that we can hold ourselves to the standard of morality that most of us prefer (which itself cannot be either good or bad).



Now that's beautiful.



And that really is what happens whenever a relativist tries to talk much about morality. But what you describe as the alternative is not moral absolutism--it's just poor thinking. A moral absolutist with any sense is not one who believes that whatever X happens to do is right--that's actually a form of relativism. Nor is an absolutist obliged to hold that killing to steal, killing in self-defense, and killing in an execution are all morally equivalent.



And finally (though it's only peripheral), whatever may be wrong with Fox and their editorial slant, the editors are probably not such morons as to have had the train of non-reasoning you suggested. The headline you captured lacks moral insight, but on the face is fairly common-sensical. The thought process probably worked more like this:

1. Killing is worse than torturing.


2. It's usually permissible to kill in self-defense.


3. So if we can kill people who try to kill us, why on earth can't we torture them?

Moral relativism isn't a guideline for morality, it is simply on observation of how it functions. Perhaps there is an absolute truth and a concrete definition of good and evil, but in order to strive toward that you must define it, and in defining morality we are constrained by the society and time period in which we live.

Following your logic, if person A wants to kill person B, then person B has a right to torture person A. But you position will likely change if person B becomes an Iraqi insurgent who is torturing person A, a soldier trying to kill him. Moral relativism is a simple observation that people define morals differently for varying situations.

And as for rebutting a philosopher's quote with a comic novelist's: I like to focus more on the substance of what is said, regardless of who said it.

The next person who quotes a pretentious philosopher without making a supporting argument will face the full force of a Dr. Seuss quote.

First, the pseudo-syllogism about torture isn't what I believe or would defend--it's my guess at the rationale behind the Fox headline. As I said, it "lacks moral insight," and all its appeal is on the surface.

And I agree that a mere quote is no argument, though I can't judge whether Scruton is pretentious. Your point might have been better made if you had skipped straight to Dr. Seuss, since it looked like you were attempting a serious answer.

On to meatier stuff. This being your post and all, I hate to argue with you about your terms, but you have used relativism variously with little overlap with the philosophical (i.e., dictionary) meaning. According to your bio, you're a sociologist by training. If you wanted to school me on sociological terminology, I wouldn't try to disagree without at least checking a dictionary. Well, I'm a philosopher by training (though not professionally practicing either), so please accept the following terminology schooling, or at least consult a reference or two before disagreeing.

For starters, there are few philosophical positions that can best be described as "observations". Simply to observe that people in different times and places think differently about morality is sociology, not philosophy. It's a fact, but by itself it has no meaning, and meaning is what concerns philosophy. Now the absolutist and the relativist are opposed, and the difference between them lies in what each thinks when he sees diversity of belief. The absolutist thinks that morality is like astronomy or math. It may in some cases be difficult to do, and there may be important things that no one has discovered yet, but stars are real and math is universal. A society's astronomy and math are properly judged by how well they conform to reality, and a society's morality is properly judged the same way. (The fact that no perfectly qualified judges are readily available is irrelevant--there are significant difficulties remaining in nearly all fields of study.) The relativist, on the other hand, thinks that morality is like language. There are perhaps a hundred different words for 'red', but none is more right than another. All is a matter of convention, and there is no external standard by which to judge. Though someone may try to change his own language, he does this because he thinks it would be more useful or beautiful with his proposed changes, not because it would be more correct.

If good and evil are only matters of convention, then we may *define* them as we collectively choose. But if they exist objectively, their definition is not up to us, we can only try to *describe* them, just as Newton stated or described the laws of motion. The laws existed before Newton and did not change when he described them. In fact physicists think that for extreme cases he got the description wrong, and they can say so because the laws of motion, whatever they are, exist independent of Newton's description. To talk about *defining* morality is to be a relativist, but to say that our efforts at *description* are limited by our circumstances is not relativism any more than pointing out that Newton could not conduct expirements with modern particle accelerators makes one a relativist about physics.

So that's absolutism vs. relativism. In contrast, saying it's ok for me to do something but not ok for you is not a question of absolutism vs relativism. That's just standard moral reasoning and a question of whether there are morally relevant differences. E.g., if I say it's ok for me to fire my gun but not ok for you to fire yours, whether that's correct or not depends on whether there are morally relevant differences. If the difference is that I'm white and you're black, that's not morally relevant and I am incorrect. If the difference is that my gun is pointed downrange at a target and yours is pointed across the fence at your neighbor's kids, that is morally relevant and I am correct.

So what is really your position? Do good and evil exist apart from what we think about them or no? It is indeed a good thing to subscribe to a better moral standard regardless of what one's enemies do, but only absolutism can even make sense of such talk. For the absolutist, among imperfect understandings of the moral standard, the better one is the one that more accurately resembles the true moral standard. For the relativist, 'better' has no content beyond 'what we prefer' or 'what we happen to think already'.

For the absolutist, among imperfect understandings of the moral standard, the better one is the one that more accurately resembles the true moral standard. For the relativist, 'better' has no content beyond 'what we prefer' or 'what we happen to think already'.

As I said before, my interpretation of moral relativism does not involve picking and choosing morals based on a situation. It is an observtion. You are right, though, it is more of a sociological approach than a philosophical.

Again, let's assume good and evil exist objectively and absolutely, and let's stick with your astronomy analogy. The moral relatavist (to my understanding) does not argue that the stars do not exist. Rather, the practice of astronomy will vary depending on the time and place in study.

I'll lay down a blanket statement that I think we both may agree on: Every person's interpretation of morality is contingent on external factors. The moral relativist recognizes this. That does not mean he picks and chooses morality or simply has no moral compass, but he recognizes that the set of morals he receives from society, religion, or whatever is merely an interpretation of the objective reality.

The absolutist, on the other hand, also receives moral guidelines from society and religion but assumes that this set of guidelines is absolute. To use a Christianity analogy, the absolutist takes the Bible as the literal word of God, whereas the relativist recognizes that it is open to interpretation. The absolutist assumes he knows the unknowable (whether God or morality), whereas the relativist acknowledges the unknowable as unknowable. That doesn't mean the latter does not strive toward knowledge.

People like Bin Laden and Pat Robertson are moral absolutists, in my view. If you can argue otherwise, I'd like to hear it.

I think the crux of our disagreement lies in our disciplines. I am approaching the question of morality from within the context of society and history. You are not.

Elyas,

Do you personally believe there are any absolutes? Physical or moral? (maybe you covered this... I skimmed...)

What I'm getting at is, would you say "There are absolutely no absolutes."

Here is one example of the problems you run into with moral relativism:
http://boenau.blogspot.com/2004/12/moral-relativism-part-2-new-film.html

I'm a moral relativist. Hence, I have designed and adopted an excellent moral system.

It's based around enriching myself, and optimising my happiness. I do whatever it takes to make life more beautiful, comfortable, and stimulating for me. This means that I'll often agree or cooperate with people, but only because it furthers my goals of making myself richer and more respected. I'm also very polite, presentable, witty, and charming, because to be so serves my interests.

I donate to worthy charities in my community, because since those charities are improving my local community, that improves my life in the longer term. It also makes me look good to others. However, I'll never help anyone if there's no benefit to be had for me.

I'm quite happy to lie when necessary, steal when necessary, and kill when necessary, as long as I'm clever enough about it, and analyse the risks and benefits properly.

I believe that it's impossible to demonstrate any flaws in my moral system from a moral relativist standpoint. I carefully examine the potential benefits, costs, and risks of all of my actions. By definition, everything that I do is the best for me. If it isn't best for me, it's because I made a mistake in weighing the costs and benefits. The only point that can be argued is whether my definition of what's best for me is correct, that being to make my life more beautiful, comfortable, and stimulating.

While my moral system may be repulsive to others, that is only because my moral system places me before them. If my moral system gave them equal footing, or advantage, they'd be happy with it. Since my moral system aims to optimise my happiness, not the happiness of others, the objections of others to moral systems such as mine can be disregarded out of hand.

I have one question though. Am I a psychopath?